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Abstract 
How will Brexit influence the UK’s transparency regime and how, in turn, will openness shape the 
UK’s Brexit process? There are three ways of looking at how Brexit may influence open government in 
the UK: through possible changes to old policies and the pushing of new ones, through the new Prime 
Minister championing transparency or supporting secrecy, and the openness of the Brexit process 
itself, which so far has seen a struggle between the executive’s secretive prerogative powers and the 
legislature’s rights to know.  
How will Brexit influence open government and how will openness influence Brexit? In June 2016 
the UK voted 51% to 48% to leave the European Union and in the wake of the vote Britain had a new 
Prime Minister and a new government. However, despite the promises of the new government the 
exact process of leaving the EU, as set out in article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, remains unclear and 
has become increasingly contentious. What appeared a relatively clear process has become opaque 
and contested.  
If transparency is now the ‘dramatically satisfying answer to every crisis and question about the 
state’ (Fenster 2015) what is its place in the UK’s Brexit process, perhaps the greatest crisis Britain 
has faced since the Second World War? There are three ways of looking at how Brexit may influence 
open government in the UK: through changes to old and new policies, the influence of the new 
Prime Minister and the openness of the Brexit process itself.  
Open Policies Old and New? 
David Cameron pledged to make the UK the most open government in the world. In common with 
other countries, the UK already has an emerging transparency ‘ecosystem’ that May inherits 
(Kreimer 2008: Richards and Smith 2015). A shifting mixture of openness instruments, technology 
and accountability have together created a flourishing openness ecosystem where FOI laws sit 
alongside more dynamic, ‘hybrid’ and less controlled instruments, from social media to mass leaks 
(Birchall 2014, 84: Kreimer 2008). The combination of formal and informal tools, pushed by a range 
of bodies, is creating a ‘permanent’ and ‘continuous’ oversight of government which can be used by 
potential ‘veto wielders’ to exercise ‘counter-democratic control’ (Schudson 2015, 237).  
However, given the continuous conflict and uncertainty, most openness regimes exist in a constant 
state of change and flux as legal rulings, political reforms and diverse use re-shape the boundaries of 
the laws. Taken together, divergent pressures frequently leads to a continuous series of attempts to 
‘dismantle’ or ‘expand’ information regimes, sometimes working in parallel (see Knill et al. 2012: 
Worthy 2017). Proposed changes have a ‘magnetic’ effect and cluster together but attempts to 
either extend or curtail openness regimes frequently run up against the forces of symbolism, 
complexity and resistance that shaped laws in the first place. 
May’s administration has set to continue the UK’s push towards greater openness with a series of 
policies, stretching from private sector accountability to a data-based audit of the equality of 
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institutions. This fits with a pattern that new governments often promote openness to set a tone. 
Self-consciously ‘reforming’ administrations in the UK in 1997 and then in 2010, the US in 2009 and 
Italy in 2013 all made transparency a priority. Openness represents an easy win to a new leader as it 
‘signals’ a whole set of messages: that a government is prepared to be open and ‘democratic’ and is 
prepared to be monitored or overseen by the public (Worthy 2017). This may be especially 
important for Prime Minister without a mandate facing the complications of Brexit. Change may 
come from alterations to existing policies or the creation of new ones.   
The existing ecosystem: Freedom of Information and Open Data 
Post-Brexit, on the surface, nothing changes to the main legal instruments of Britain’s openness 
regime. The key piece of openness legislation, the Freedom of Information Act 2000, is enshrined in 
UK law and very unlikely to be repealed.  
Nevertheless, behind the scenes there have been a series of attempts at ‘dismantling’ or chipping 
away at parts of the law since 2005, with roughly one attempt floated every 18 months to 2 years. 
They began under Tony Blair with a proposed introduction of fees or change to the cost limits 
(2006), followed by an attempt via a Private Members’ Bill to remove Parliament from the law 
(2007) and, under Brown, the proposed removal of Monarch and Heir (2010). The Conservative-
Liberal Democrat Coalition then mooted a clampdown on ‘industrial users’ (2012-2013) and the 
Conservative government suggested amending the veto (2015). Only the removal of the Monarch 
and Heir, pushed through at the end of the 2010 Labour government with little publicity, was 
successful. The other attempts were stopped by a powerful barrage of press criticism, opposition 
with Parliament and sustained campaigns to stop them.   
 In 2015 the Cameron government announced an Independent inquiry into the FOI Act and gave it a 
remit to examine the potential effect on decision-making and costs of the law. Despite fears it would 
seek to water down the law, the FOI Commission’s clear endorsement of the Act in 2016 and the 
sheer scale of the resistance to change by the media and civil society halted any attempt to limit it 
(Worthy and Hazell 2016). However, in late 2016 the new government was ‘carefully considering’ a 
proposed curtailing of the automatic right to the second stage of appeal (MOJ 2016). 
Yet the FOI law has also expanded by reforms and legal rulings. There was limited change in 2007-
2009 to cover exam bodies and then an inclusion of databases in 2012. In 2015 the strategic rail 
authority came under FOI, though owing to a change in accounting designation rather than a 
purposeful change. The Independent Commission in 2016 also proposed greater publication of pay 
data and some minor improvements that the government endorsed. The new Information 
Commissioner has also announced she is prepared to champion the inclusion of private sector 
bodies directly under FOI (rather than simply using contractual clauses on FOI in procurement 
agreements), something the Independent review also suggested (Denham 2016).  
It is less clear what may happen to some of the lesser EU initiated laws on openness. The 
government has promised a ‘Great Repeal Bill’, a grandfathering law to turn all current EU law into 
UK law in one go. This appears to mean that any EU initiated laws or transposed regulations, such as 
the Public Sector Re-use and Environmental Information Regulations, will be kept and somehow be 
preserved. As Brexit means the end of the supremacy of EU law over UK law, this does, however, 
make them equally susceptible post-Brexit to repeal or amendment, especially if, as suggested, all 
the new laws carry a five year sunset clause. The Great Repeal Bill will contain a so-called Henry VIII 
clause which ‘enables government to repeal or amend primary legislation by means of a secondary 
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act with limited or no further parliamentary scrutiny’, giving ministers power to alter laws outside of 
the legislature’s oversight (Grogan 2016). 
The Open Data agenda, pushed a by a succession of Labour and Conservative governments since 
2009, will also continue. As figure 1 shows, the government is locked in to a series of commitments 
through its OGP Third National Action Plan (NAP) meaning the May administration essentially 
inherits a series of ongoing reforms. Looking across the UK’s 3rd OGP National Action Plan the top 
three commitments around Beneficial Ownership, extractives transparency and anti-corruption were 
very much David Cameron’s personal agenda but look set to be continued. In addition, a number of 
reforms from the Cameron administration are still ongoing with, for example, the first Beneficial 
Ownership data only being released in June 2016.  
Figure 1: UK Government’s Third National Action Plan 2016-2018 
3rd OGP National Action Plan 
 
 
Commitment 1: Beneficial ownership 
Commitment 2: Natural resource transparency 
Commitment 3: Anti-Corruption Strategy 
Commitment 4: Anti-Corruption Innovation Hub 
Commitment 5: Open contracting 
Commitment 6: Grants data 
Commitment 7: Elections data 
Commitment 8: Enhanced transparency requirements and revised Freedom of Information Act 
Code of Practice 
Commitment 9: Identifying and publishing core data assets 
Commitment 10: Involving data users in shaping the future of open data 
Commitment 11: Better use of data assets 
Commitment 12: GOV.UK 
Commitment 13: Ongoing collaborative approach to open government reform 
(Cabinet Office 2016) 
New Developments 
As well as inheriting an ecosystem and ongoing policies, Theresa May’s speeches and actions have 
indicated a desire to go further. In July 2016 May spoke of how she wished to see ‘more 
transparency, including the full disclosure of bonus targets and the publication of “pay multiple” 
data: that is, the ratio between the CEO’s pay and the average company worker’s pay (May 2016). In 
terms of concrete policies, so far the government’s policies have consisted of 
 A data equality audit of UK political institutions in order to ‘check how their race affects how 
they are treated on key issues such as health, education and employment, broken down by 
geographic location, income and gender’ and to ‘shine a light on how our public services 
treat people from different backgrounds and influence government policy to solve these 
problems’ (Prime Minister’s Office 2016). 
 A push for greater openness over executive pay in the private sector, perhaps symbolised by 
greater openness over BBC pay to its senior figures and stars paid over £ 150,000 (Telegraph 
14/09/2016)  
 More action on tax havens (Times 26/07/2016)  
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The common thread behind such moves is that transparency will trigger a chain of actions: the public 
or users will be interested, will use the information and data that is published, and they and others 
can then act upon the data to leverage change. As a result cultural and behavioural change will occur 
within institutions e.g. driving down pay.  
Research increasingly questions each of these assumptions. There is no ‘general’ ideal user and, 
while some openness initiatives generate public interest, others do not. As Roberts (2015) points out 
this chain from asking or accessing data to actually receiving it and levering change is a long and 
weak one. If or whether it can lever reforms depends on the context in which the information is 
placed and whether the instruments are available to enforce institutional or behaviour change (de 
Fine Licht 2014). The hope behind transparency, that information will rationally influence or 
persuade calculating voters or engaged citizens has not been borne out (Bauhr and Grimes 2014). 
Users and voters hold ‘deeply engrained’ views about government and other institutions that are 
hard to dislodge. Any change due to new information appears brief and subject specific (Marvel 
2016). 
The example of publishing pay is instructive. Evidence from a similar initiatives publishing public 
sector pay in Canada found that disclosure had no effect (Gomez and Wald 2010). Moreover, 
evidence from studies of the private sector point to the possibility that disclosure actually increases 
overall salaries by creating upward pressure from colleagues (Schmidt 2011). Such a narrow 
emphasis on levels of pay and benchmarks also obscures other important issues around 
performance (see Jensen and Wald 1990). 
A further possibility is that new openness policies may be forced upon the government. In 
September 2016 the government accepted an amendment to a bill requiring the public reporting of 
‘country-by-country reporting of taxes paid by multi-national corporations’. More importantly, in 
November 2016 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human ruled in Magyar Helsinki 
Bizottság v. Hungary that, within limits, there existed a new right to access under the European 
Convention on Human Rights article 10. This applies where there is a public benefit and where the 
requester has a ‘public watchdog’ role, a potentially wide definition including ‘the 
press…NGOs…authors, academics, bloggers and ‘popular users of social media’. This could include 
information held by bodies currently excluded under FOI, such as GCHQ, the security services or 
election officers, and may also weaken the government’s veto and a number of the absolute 
exemptions under FOI (CFOI 15/11/2016).  
An Open Prime Minister? 
Political leaders set the tone and send out signals about the openness of their governments (Hazell 
et al 2010). Table 1 summarises how the UK’s last three Prime Ministers did and to what extent they 
tried to extend or pushback (i.e. limit) openness. Political leaders often declare support for greater  
openness though their enthusiasm, whether real or feigned, often dims from a mixture of 
disappointment, cynicism and wish for less exposure and greater control of communications 
(Berliner 2014). There is a natural, if not wholly inevitable, trajectory towards secrecy as events, 
scandal and enemies build: ‘How many leaders have come into office determined to work for more 
open government, only to end by fretting over leaks, seeking new ways to classify documents and 
questioning the loyalty of outspoken subordinates?’ (Bok 1986, 177). 
UK Prime Ministers and Openness 2005-2016 
Prime 
Minister 
Extension Pushback 
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Tony Blair Passed FOI Act in 2000 Fees mooted (2006), 
(tacitly) supported 
attempt to have 
Parliament excluded 
(2007) 
Gordon 
Brown 
Extension of 30 year rule 
(2009) and slight extension of 
FOI to new areas 
Cabinet exclusion 
mooted, Excluded 
Monarchy from FOI 
(2010) 
David 
Cameron 
OGP especially Open Data 
agenda (2010 onwards) and 
Beneficial Ownership 
transparency (2013) 
Mooted changes on 
‘industrial users’ 2012-
2013) and FOI 
commission (2015-
2016) 
 
While Tony Blair passed the FOI between 1997 and 2000 he later regretted it, describing it as one of 
his biggest mistakes and claimed FOI was being used as a weapon. His successor Gordon Brown and 
then David Cameron both made strong speeches in favour of openness and pushed various 
transparency reforms. Cameron perhaps exemplified the competing desire for openness and wish 
for secrecy: while in opposition in 2009 David Cameron pledged ‘true Freedom of Information’ 
through a greater use of Open Data and technology, and again in office in 2010 promised a 
‘transparency revolution’ with aim of making ‘in time...our government one of the most open and 
transparent in the world’ (BBC 2009: Prime Minister’s Office 2010). While Cameron pushed a series 
of apparently radical open data reforms from 2010 onwards, many of which were aimed at the 
private sector in 2015 he also set up the FOI Commission described above to restrict the Act and 
described the law at various points as a ‘buggeration factor’ and something that was ‘furring up the 
arteries of government’ (Worthy and Hazell 2016).  
So how about new Prime Minister May? May spent six years as Home Secretary (i.e. Interior 
Minister). During that time she pushed transparency within the UK anti-corruption agenda and was a 
key supporter of the long running Hillsborough campaign that exposed police corruption in the late 
1980s. She has also extended FOI to the Police Federation and opened up police disciplinary 
hearings, though some complained May was keen only on transparency transparent about her 
opponents. On a personal level May was quick to publish her own tax details during her campaign to 
be Conservative leader. 
On the minus side, May has been in charge of a department with a long reputation for secrecy.  
Historically, the Home Office sunk many plans for greater openness (Worthy 2017). Under May was 
regularly the third or so in the worst performing departments for FOI across UK government (IFG 
2016). This is in part due to the often difficult and sensitive nature of some of the Home Office’s 
work.  
May herself also has a less than liberal stance elsewhere: critics could well discern a tendency to 
information control and secrecy. She sought to hide Border Force cuts from Parliament in 2016 and, 
more famously, deflected blame onto officials in 2011 during a career threatening crisis (Guardian 
18/4/2016: BBC 2011). May’s mode of working is also seen as secretive and closed in the Home 
Office: 
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Mrs May’s preference for working with a close team of advisers, often not bothering to 
share information with Number 10 or other ministers... Mrs May’s tendency [is] to work 
with a small team [with a] lack of trust in cabinet colleagues (FT 12/7/2016)  
The same habits appeared to be carried over into the premiership. As one commentator put it  
Theresa May survived as home secretary for six years partly because she held a tight grip 
over information flows. Perhaps she believes such a model of command-and-control will 
translate to the different task of prime minister. Perhaps she thinks that the press and MPs 
can be kept in the dark over the UK’s negotiating position (Green 30/11/2016). 
A leaked note also confirmed that May wished to ‘draw in decisions and settle matters herself’ over 
Brexit (Guardian 15/11/2016). In October 2016 the IFG were forced to FOI the government to obtain 
details of the Brexit Cabinet subcommittee, information that is normally published proactively (IFG 
2016). May’s refusal, in response to an FOI request, to release her own internet search history over 
her proposed surveillance law also led to a backlash from MPs (Guardian 30/1/2016).  
By far the biggest concern is over the repeated attempts by May to pass wide-ranging investigatory 
powers legislation (aka ‘the Snoopers Charter’). This finally became law in November 2016 after 
repeated attempts. It gives the right for security services to carry out bulk surveillance, essentially 
legalising the practices exposed by Edward Snowden in 2013, and led to ‘controversy around 
encryption, bulk data and hacking and the right of various security services to carry out mass 
surveillance on the public’ (Computer world 2/11/2016). Very serious privacy concerns have been 
raised by Parliament, civil rights groups and lawyers, as well as Facebook and Google with the UN 
privacy commissioner also warning it not compliant with international law.  
May’s tendencies towards secrecy are unlikely to be liberalised by office. The Brexit process, and 
May herself, will come under unprecedented pressure for openness from the whole variety of 
‘monitory bodies’ or ‘political observatories’ that are increasingly watching government (Schudson 
2015: Keane 2009). Whether through FOI requests, Select Committees and Questions in Parliament, 
and leaks from rivals and opponents, is unlikely that many secrets will be kept for very long (Posen 
2013). Already members of the opposition SNP have used FOI to open the government’s promises to 
car-maker Nissan, select committees have begun a series of detailed inquiries and leaks, accidental 
or otherwise, from Ministers, consultants and advisors have already broken down some of the strict 
secrecy May promised around Brexit.  
An Open Brexit? 
The constitutional debate over Brexit has focused on the role of Parliament and government, given 
the vagueness around article 50’s reference to ‘constitutional arrangements’ in the UK where the 
constitution is uncodified. The new May government asserted that it was for government to declare 
and trigger article 50 and conduct the subsequent confidential negotiations. Parliament countered 
that the legislature must play a role, given the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty that underpins 
the UK’s uncodified constitution, and the process must, necessarily, be open. The story of Brexit, so 
far, is of a government seeking secrecy being forced to commit to increasing the openness of the 
process: not just about a ‘hard’ versus ‘Soft’ Brexit but a secret versus a transparent one.  
The crux of the tricky debate between openness and closure and the extent to which Parliament 
(and the public) has a right to know and shape the negotiations. On the one hand, confidentiality is 
recognised in many areas of life where openness would inhibit genuine expression, from juries to 
peace negotiations (Chambers 2004: Bok 1986). Academic studies offered equivocal evidence. 
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Stasavage’s study of the European Council of Ministers found openness can be good at regulating 
behaviour in negotiations but can encourage posturing or unnecessary ‘signalling’ to domestic 
audiences or the pushing of actual negotiations to the shadows:  
...when constituents can better observe decision making, this has the advantage of 
disciplining representatives, but transparency can also have costs involving increased 
incentives for representatives to posture and to ignore private beliefs about appropriate 
policies (Stasavage 2005, 3).  
Others have pointed to the possible counter-productive effects on negotiations of openness in 
encouraging hidden behaviour (Prat 2006). Yet the right and need to be involved, and the demands 
of democratic legitimacy through deliberation, offered equally persuasive demands amid so far-
reaching a change (Chambers 2004). David Allen Green points out this tension is made more 
complex by the fact that the real source of problems and potential audience is not the EU 27 but ‘her 
true Brexit opponents are the UK’s media and politicians and, by extension, the public’ who must be 
persuaded (30/11/2016).  
The government initially sought to cling to the confidentiality principle, and use its secretive 
prerogative power, the vestige of Monarchical power that can be used to declare war or authorise 
treaties:  
The royal prerogative refers to those powers left over from when the monarch was directly 
involved in government, powers that now include making treaties, declaring war, deploying 
the armed forces, regulating the civil service, and granting pardons. (Poole 2010, 146).  
The prerogative remains ill-defined with Parliament taking an increasing role in a number of the 
areas including war-making and treaty assent. Nevertheless, it remains an area of ‘constitutional 
exceptionalism’, surrounded with the ‘mysteries of state, and the cloaking of executive power’ which 
is only ‘semi-impervious to norms of legality’ (Poole 2010, 154-155). The ‘defining characteristic of 
the prerogative is that its exercise does not require the approval of Parliament’ (Poole 2010, 146). 
The government’s seeming tight information control was reinforced by constitutional conventions 
such as collective responsibility that binds Ministers to public unanimity and confidentiality. Prime 
Minister May promised strict confidentiality and that ‘there will be “no running commentary” or any 
substantial disclosure from Downing Street’ on the negotiations (Green 30/11/2016). 
The government offered some access to the process. In September 2016 the new secretary of State 
for Brexit committed to being ‘as open as I can. More accurately, the Government will be as open as 
they can’. He argued there would be ‘debates, reports by Select Committees and hearings’ and he 
promised: 
We will certainly match and, hopefully, improve on what the European Parliament sees. At 
given times, that will be tactical, I am afraid. I do not want to be boring about it, but this is 
likely to be the most complicated negotiation of modern times. It may be the most 
complicated negotiation of all times. By comparison, Schleswig-Holstein is an O-level 
question. We will not always be entirely free agents, but we will be as open as we can be. 
(House of Lords EU 2016) 
He also spoke of impossibility of secrecy 
....I will seek to be as open as is possible...Even were I to decide that I was going to behave 
like Rasputin and keep it all entirely secret, I would fail. It would not be possible...other 
Governments would do it. In the Government’s own interest, it is a better idea to be more 
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open than is perhaps traditional, but always subject to the overriding point that we cannot 
pre-empt the negotiation (House of Lords EU 2016) 
 
In October the report from the House of Lords EU select Committee took a rather stronger view of 
what right Parliament had (2016)  
 
One of the key objectives of parliamentary scrutiny is to ensure transparency— 
to cast a light on the actions of the executive. It is, we suggest, essential that 
many elements of the forthcoming negotiations—for instance, negotiations 
affecting acquired rights, or future cooperation between UK and EU police 
forces—should be conducted transparently (House of Lords EU 2016a). 
 
It went on to acknowledge the difficulty around complex negotiations and the need to not ‘show a 
hand’ early: ‘at the same time, some of the most important and complex aspects of the 
forthcoming negotiations on a new relationship will be sensitive...and will require a high degree of 
confidentiality’(House of Lords 2016a). 
 
Some critics were less than convinced by the need for government secrecy, in part because it 
appeared to them that the government were not shielding a plan but seeking to hide the lack of a 
plan and possible divisions within government ‘the government does not want to involve parliament 
or the courts any more than it can get away with...Perhaps it thinks it will lose votes or that Brexit 
itself will be delayed. Or perhaps it is seeking to be shielded from embarrassment if its lack of 
thought and capability about Brexit are exposed’ (Green 10/10/2016). A leading think-tank also 
warned the government that ‘silence is not a strategy’ (IFG 2016a). In November 2016 a leaked 
memo by Deloitte revealed that ‘no common strategy has emerged’ for Brexit and that ministers 
were split on the issue (Guardian 15/11/2016). The government’s justification and card game 
analogy was also criticised: 
Those who say the government should not reveal its hand are mistaking Brexit negotiations 
for a backroom game of cards. Obscurity and secrecy are the enemies of a sustainable 
Brexit. The aim of the negotiations is not to defeat any opponent (and Britain’s “opponents” 
know the strengths and weaknesses of the country’s “hand” as much as the UK does), but to 
ensure there are agreements that work in practice, are acceptable to those who have an 
interest, and have legitimacy in principle. The best way – indeed, the only way – for Brexit to 
be a success is through openness and accountability (Green 10/10/2016) 
It was pointed out that ‘Brussels probably knows the strengths and weaknesses of the UK 
negotiating position better than the UK itself’ (Green 30/11/2016). Indeed, the EU 27, from Prime 
Minister and Presidents to ambassadors, have already offered a ‘flow of information about Brexit’ 
and ‘a detailed and helpful running commentary’ that has exposed the UK’s ‘lack of a practical 
plan’(Green 30/11/2016). As a consequence, the secrecy is for the government’s domestic audience: 
Ministers know that “making a success of Brexit” is a domestic political objective. And so the 
lack of communication serves as a way of...structuring expectations [and] cloak[ing] the 
government’s ongoing inability to form a settled view on which of the available outcomes is 
preferable (Green 30/11/2016). 
The government’s plan for a ‘closed’, prerogative based Brexit came unstuck in in November 2016 
when the High Court ruled in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] 
that, in passing the European Communities Act 1972 and the constitutional rights in entailed, 
government ceded its prerogative powers and Parliament, not the executive, must have the ultimate 
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say (Elliott 2016). In the wake of the high court ruling, one legal scholar argued that ‘Parliament must 
be given clear rights to notice, to comment on key negotiating positions and draft agreement text, 
and to a response from the Government to its comments’ ‘(King 7 Nov 2016). After the November 
High Court judgement greater openness made inevitable: ‘eventually, the government will have to 
adopt a broader, more collaborative and more open approach to the process, as there is no 
alternative to making a success of it’ (FT 4 November 2016) 
In the wake of the judgment, the government also committed to providing the same openness to UK 
MPs as the EU Parliament-though this carried a twist, as EU MEPs currently have only ‘closed 
oversight’ through heavily protected reading rooms or meetings that the UK government promised 
to emulate. This can mean documents are restricted to certain MPs in a certain time and place, with 
no disclosure, copying or reproduction allowed: 
...arrangements lead to parliamentary oversight taking place behind closed doors or more 
simply stated, to closed oversight. Closed oversight means that both the manner in which 
oversight is conducted and the results of oversight are not public to the other members of 
parliament and to the general public (Abazi 2016, 12) 
As of this moment, much depends on the Supreme Court ruling in early December 2016.  
Devolution and Brexit 
Looking further into the future, the impact of Brexit could get more complicated. Since the 1990s 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales have been given representative bodies, a process that 
reflected but also accelerated the creation of distinct territorial politics across the UK (Jeffery 2009). 
Cameron and now May have also strongly pushed greater regional government for the English 
regions, with new city and regional elected mayors and combined ‘super’ local authorities (Blunkett 
et al 2016). More power to the nation and regions is a solution both to the different Brexit votes 
(Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to Remain) and a means of offering citizens greater control 
following a result seen as a backlash against remote elites (Inglehart and Norris 2016). This may have 
two effects. 
First, devolved bodies can be party to negotiations and involved in accessing details through bodies 
such as the regular meetings of heads of devolved bodies and promised sub-groups:  ‘the devolved 
governments and legislatures should enjoy formal participation in the consultation process in rough 
parity with the Westminster Parliament’ (King 7 Nov 2016). This will make the process more 
collaborative but, by including more actors (some of whom are opposed to Brexit) may make it more 
likely to leak. 
Second, in the longer term the new elites and centres may develop their own agendas and polices. 
The devolved Scottish government and Northern Irish Executive have both drawn up separate Open 
Data agendas and plans along different time scales (Worthy 2015a). The Scottish government 
already has its own separate FOI legislation that has been extended further than the UK law to 
leisure trusts and certain privately run schools. Scotland’s Open Data plan for 2015-2017 aimed for a 
baseline of re-publishable data and a new rediscovery website, with a promise of an iterative Open 
Data strategy developed with Scottish civil society (Scottish Government 2015). The Northern Irish 
Executive has established its own Open Data roadmap covering 2015 and 2018 with an aim of 
becoming ‘digital by default’ and creating a single Northern Ireland Open Data node (Department of 
Finance 2015). The civil society networks supporting Open Data also has separate networks covering 
the devolved institutions. Though it is not clear what divergence will result, the implications are of 
policy deviance in motion.  
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Other institutions may also follow suit: The UK Parliament has also drawn its own Digital Democracy 
agenda including publishing voting details and records as Open Data by 2016 and, more far-reaching, 
pushing for online voting by 2020 (Digital Democracy 2015). Stronger English local government may 
also provide a site of greater innovation. Despite the central attempts at control, local authorities 
have also experimented with a whole host of bottom up initiatives working with a range of groups 
and other public bodies (LGA 2012: Worthy 2015). Officials in local government also display higher 
knowledge and awareness of Open Data and greater use of both their and own and others’ data in 
their everyday work. A set of devolved ‘plus’ institutions could easily make some very interesting 
regional variation in openness across the UK. The UK government’s 3rd NAP recognises this by 
promising ‘ongoing collaborative approach to open government reform’ though it is not clear 
whether policies will be merged or overlap. 
 Conclusion 
There are various scenarios for how Brexit and Open Government can unfold. Perhaps the best case 
scenario, from the viewpoint of the government, is that openness policies pushed by government 
become an identifying mark for the new administration. The new policies could help the Prime 
Minister establish a distinct reform programme while re-energising the government and, given the 
emphasis on the private sector, the economy at a precarious time. Greater openness around Brexit 
itself may help to legitimise, and even democratise, the process and bind some of the national, 
societal and inter-institutional fractures opened by the referendum. 
The worst case scenario would see openness consumed by Brexit. Policies would stall with only 
superficial change actually masking inaction or even pushback, as seen with the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers legislation. The Brexit process could pitch a secretive ‘bunker mentality’ prime 
minister and government against a legislature (and perhaps the devolved assemblies and courts) 
seeking to force them open, with uncertain results for who controls the process of leaving the EU. As 
an unelected takeover Prime Minister with a small majority, May is likely to face party instability and 
a relatively short-time in office (Worthy 2016). There may be less time, but more need, for openness 
than she thinks. 
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